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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jourdarryl Karrie Horton appeals from his conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to deliver. Horton challenges the denial of his 
suppression motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Officer Sunada observed Horton driving toward him in a vehicle without a 
front license plate. (Tr., p. 8, L. 16 - p. 9, L. 16.) This observation prompted the 
officer to turn around and get in a position behind Horton. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 17-20.) 
Once behind Horton, Officer Sunada took the information from the rear license 
plate and ran a registration check with it. (Tr., p. 9, L. 24 - p. 10, L. 2.) Officer 
Sunada received an unusual result to his registration check; he got information 
that the registered owner was a business, Tactical Recovery, but not the 
description of the vehicle. (Tr., p. 10, L. 12 - p. 11, L. 14.) Because the vehicle 
did not have a front license plate, Officer Sunada conducted a traffic stop. (Tr., 
p. 11, Ls. 20-23.) 
Once the vehicle was stopped, Officer Sunada ran Horton's information 
through the system, and discovered he had a confirmed warrant for his arrest. 
(Tr., p. 11, L. 24 - p. 12, L. 8.) The officer arrested Horton and put him in the 
back of his patrol vehicle. (Tr., p. 12, L. 9 - p. 13, L. 4.) After Horton was 
arrested on the warrant, the officer searched Horton's vehicle, resulting in the 
seizure of drug evidence. (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 12-19.) 
The state charged Horton with possession of a controlled substance with 
the intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 22-23.) 
Horton filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the state as a result of a 
traffic stop that was initiated "without a warrant and without being under the 
auspices of any recognizable exception to the warrant requirement." (R., pp. 29- 
31 .) Following a hearing on the motion where testimony was presented, the 
district court made the following oral findings in denying Horton's motion to 
suppress: 
[Tjhe defendant was stopped by the officer when it appeared he 
violated ldaho law that required two license plates, one in the front, 
one in the back, to be on every passenger car. 
The license plate that was on the car had a designation RPO. That 
is a designation that is not statutory, nor is the designation by the 
ldaho Department of Transportation's regulations or other written 
documents. 
When the officer stopped the vehicle, he asked for the - and he 
also - he stopped the vehicle for two reasons: One is that there's 
not a front license plate, which we all agree the law requires on 
regular passenger vehicles; and also because when he ran the 
vehicle plate, he got back a very confusing response, which is 
multiple page numbers with no descriptions of the vehicle. 
So what he got was a puzzling response with multiple pages of 
information but not a description of the particular vehicle, and a 
name of Tactical Recovery. 
The name itself, while not necessarily leading one to the suspect, it 
was a repossession agency, and there is no evidence that the 
officer himself had personal knowledge that was a repossession 
agency. 
Then he asked the defendant for his identification. He ran the 
identification, and that's when he discovers that there is an 
outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant, and then he arrests 
the defendant. Therefore, he searches the defendant and the 
vehicle incident to arrest. 
There are several factors that are important. One fact that I think is 
important is that the overall time sequence is closely connected. 
It's not a situation where there's a major delay between stopping 
the vehicle and asking for the defendant's license. There is no 
indication there is any kind of investigation or time lag between 
stopping the vehicle and asking for the license. 
(Tr., p. 34, L. 25 - p. 36, L. 17.) In determining that the officer acted 
appropriately, the district court found: 
It requires that there be reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
there is a traffic violation, and in this case, the lack of the front 
plates, the lack of any designation anywhere in writing, either by 
statute or by regulation, that RPO designates a repossession 
vehicle seems to me that under the particular circumstances of this 
case the initial stop is a valid stop and, therefore, the officer's 
actions which follow are appropriate. 
(Tr., p. 40, Ls. 8-17.) 
Horton pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver (Tr., p. 42, L. 16 - p. 63, L. 14) and was placed on probation and 
sentenced to an underlying sentence of two years fixed followed by three years 
indeterminate. (Tr., p. 77, Ls. 10-12; R., pp. 73-78.) 
Horton filed a timely appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., 
Horton states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Horton's motion 
to suppress because the stop violated Mr. Horton's constitutional 
rights as Officer Sunda failed to possess any reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to believe Mr. Horton had been involved in any 
criminal activity, and therefore, evidence seized should have been 
suppressed? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Officers searched the vehicle Horton was driving incident to his arrest on a 
warrant discovered after a traffic stop. Has Horton failed to show either that the 
search was improper or that he was entitled to exclusion of the evidence found 
pursuant to the search? 
ARGUMENT 
The Stop of Horton's Vehicle Did Not Violate His Rights Against Unreasonable 
Searches 
A. Introduction 
Horton argues on appeal that the "district court erred denying the 
[suppression] motion because Officer Sunada lacked reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that Mr. Horton committed a traffic offense." (Appellant's brief, p. 1.) 
Additionally, Horton now argues that the state's alternative argument below of the 
attenuation doctrine remedying the possible taint of a illegal traffic stop "would 
have failed because arresting Mr. Horton on an outstanding search [sic] warrant 
would not have authorized Officer Sunada to search the vehicle under Arizona v. 
Gant." (Appellant's brief, p. 1 (citation and parenthetical omitted).) Horton's 
arguments fail. 
The record supports the district court's determination that the stop of 
Horton was a valid traffic stop based on the officer's reasonable articulable 
suspicion that Horton was committing a traffic offense. (Tr., p. 40, Ls. 8-17.) 
Further, even if the court had not determined the initial stop to be valid, the 
district court's findings support a conclusion that the discovery of an arrest 
warrant constituted an intervening circumstance justifying the seizure of Horton 
and dissipating the taint of any possible illegality. 
Likewise, Horton has failed to show that the search of the car violated his 
rights because he failed to show he had a legitimate privacy right in the car. In 
addition, even if the subsequent search of the vehicle Horton was driving was in 
contravention of the recent holding in Arizona v. Gant, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 
1710 (2009), the exclusionary rule does not apply because the officer acted in 
good faith reliance on law as it existed at the time of the search. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the district court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 
141 ldaho 728,730,117 P.3d 142,144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
C. Horton Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination 
That Horton Was Not Seized In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment 
I The Record Supports The District Court's Findinqs That The Traffic 
Stop Of Horton Was Based On Reasonable Articulable Suspicion 
That A Traffic Violation Had Been Committed 
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. 
Atkinson, 128 ldaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). A traffic 
stop is constitutionally justified, however, if the officer possesses a reasonable 
suspicion, based upon articulable facts, that the vehicle is being driven contrary 
to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. 
Rawlinqs, 121 ldaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Flowers, 131 
ldaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). The reasonable suspicion 
standard requires less than probable cause, but more than mere speculation or 
instinct on the part of the officer. Flowers, 131 ldaho at 209, 953 P.2d at 649. 
The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion must be evaluated in light of the 
totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 ldaho 
474,483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The district court found that Horton was "stopped by the officer when it 
appeared he violated ldaho law that required two license plates, one in the front, 
one in the back, to be on every passenger car."' (Tr., p. 34, L. 25 - p. 35, L. 4.) 
Additionally, the court found that the license plate on the car driven by Horton 
had a designation RPO which "is not statutory, nor is the designation by the 
ldaho Department of Transportation's regulations or other written documents." 
(Tr., p. 35, Ls. 5-9.) Although the officer ran the back license plate number prior 
to effectuating the traffic stop, the multiple pages of the response did not include 
a vehicle description and gave only a business name which did not necessarily 
lead a person to the conclusion that it was a repossession a g e n ~ y . ~  (See Tr., p. 
45, L. 18 - p. 36, L. 1 .) 
A review of the evidence presented in this case supports the district 
court's conclusion that the officer's actions in stopping Horton on suspicion of a 
license plate violation were based on reasonable articulable suspicion and 
therefore not violative of Horton's rights against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The uncontroverted testimony at the hearing was that Horton was 
driving a car without a front license plate ((Tr., p. 8, L. 16 - p. 9, L. 14), but with a 
rear plate that read "RPO 393." (Tr., p. 9, L. 21 - p. 10, L. 6.) The officer 
' ldaho Code Section 49-428(1) provides that "License plates assigned to a motor 
vehicle shall be attached, one (1) in the front and the other in the rear. . ." 
ldaho Code Section 49-428(1)(a) provides that "[tjhe license plate assigned to a 
. . . repossession agent or dealer shall be attached to the rear." 
testified he was unaware of any regulations that dealt with what would constitute 
a repossession plate. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 11-17.) The testimony also established that 
the officer ran the rear license plate before initiating a traffic stop, receiving 
multiple pages of information including a business name, but no vehicle 
description. (Tr., p. 10, L. 8 - p. 11, L. 19.) Further, the district court heard the 
testimony of a senior special agent in charge of the ldaho Transportation 
Department who explained that the neither the ldaho Code nor the IDAPA rules 
specify a designation for what repossession plates are to look like even though it 
has been the practice of the Transportation Department to issue repossession 
plates that begin with "RPO followed by numbers. (Tr., p. 20, L. 14 - p. 23, L. 
5.) The district court correctly determined that the officer had a basis to stop 
Horton's vehicle based on a reasonable articulable suspicion that Horton was 
driving a vehicle without a front license plate, contrary to ldaho law. 
2. Even If The Traffic Stop Of Horton Was Found To Have Violated 
Horton's Riahts, The Discoverv Of A Valid Warrant For Horton's 
Arrest Constituted A Valid Intervening Circumstance 
A valid arrest is an intervening circumstance, such that evidence 
discovered as a result of that arrest is untainted by any unlawfulness in a search 
and seizure that preceded the lawful arrest. State v. Paae, 140 ldaho 841, 845- 
46, 103 P.3d 454, 458-59 (2004); United States v. Green, 11 1 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 
1997) (outstanding arrest warrant gives the officer independent probable cause 
such that, had the officers acted unlawfully, the warrant would constitute an 
intervening circumstance dissipating the taint of the illegality). Where, as here, 
there was a valid warrant for Horton's arrest, such warrant can constitute an 
intervening circumstance making valid the initial seizure of Horton by law 
enforcement during the traffic stop even if that initial police contact was improper. 
m, 140 ldaho at 846-847, 103 P.3d at 459-460. 
In United States v. Green, 11 1 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997), the court 
determined that although the initial stop was invalid, the arrest of Green and the 
search of the automobile incident to that arrest complied with Green's Fourth 
Amendment rights. The court explained: 
It would be startling to suggest that because the police illegally 
stopped an automobile, they cannot arrest an occupant who is 
found to be wanted on a warrant - in a sense requiring an official 
call of "Olly, Olly Oxen Free." Because the arrest is lawful, a 
search incident to the arrest is also lawful. The lawful arrest of 
[Green] constituted an intervening circumstance sufficient to 
dissipate any taint caused by the illegal automobile stop. 
Green, 11 1 F.3d at 521. The Green court further explained: 
Where a lawful arrest pursuant to a warrant constitutes the 
"intervening circumstance" (as in this case) it is an even more 
compelling case for the conclusion that the taint of the original 
illegality is dissipated. . . . [I]n the case of an arrest made pursuant 
to a warrant there is . . . no chance that the police have exploited 
an illegal arrest by creating a situation in which [the] criminal 
response is predictable. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has since interpreted and applied Green in 
State v. Maland, 140 ldaho 817, 103 P.3d 430 (2004), and State v. Paae, 140 
ldaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004). In Maland, officers responded to a noise 
complaint at a residence. When they arrived, they contacted the occupants of 
the residence, although there was no discernible noise violation at the time. 
Maiand answered the door. During the ensuing conversation regarding who 
owned the house and Maland's identity, officers became suspicious and, when 
Maland attempted to terminate the conversation by shutting the door, one of the 
officers blocked the door with her foot and both officers pushed against it. As a 
result of the officers' actions, Maland relented, came out of the house and 
produced his identification - a suspended driver's license. A check with dispatch 
revealed that Maland had an active bench warrant. Maland was charged with 
possession of a suspended driver's license and obstructing an officer. Maland, 
140 ldaho at 818-19, 103 P.3d at 431-32. The ldaho Supreme Court rejected the 
state's argument that Green supported a conclusion that the existence of the 
prior probable cause determination supporting the arrest warrant was an 
intervening circumstance dissipating the taint of the unlawful seizure. Maland, 
140 ldaho at 823-24, 103 P.3d at 436-37. The Court emphasized that, in Green, 
the arrest warrant was discovered and executed before the officers searched 
Green's car and discovered the evidence sought to be suppressed, while in 
Maland, the evidence -the suspended driver's license itself - was seized before 
the officers discovered the outstanding arrest warrant. Maland, 140 ldaho at 
824,103 P.3d at 437. 
In m, an officer saw Page walking late at night in the middle of a 
residential roadway carrying some bags. Without activating his overhead lights, 
the officer stopped his patrol vehicle, exited the vehicle and made contact with 
Page on the side of the road. The officer asked Page if he could talk to him for a 
moment, and Page replied, "Sure." After inquiring about Page's well-being, the 
officer asked Page for some identification and was handed a driver's license. 
The officer ran a name check, which revealed an outstanding arrest warrant. 
When the officer searched Page incident to arrest, he discovered 
methamphetamine, marijuana and paraphernalia. m, 140 ldaho at 842-43, 
103 P.2d at 455-56. Although the ldaho Supreme Court agreed with the district 
court that Page was improperly detained when the officer obtained his driver's 
license, it reversed the district court's order granting Page's motion to suppress. 
The Court first acknowledged that, to determine whether to suppress evidence as 
"fruit of the poisonous tree," it must first "inquire whether the evidence has been 
recovered as a result of the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." m, 140 ldaho at 
846, 103 P.3d at 459. The Court applied the attentuation doctrine originally set 
forth in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), and used by the Seventh Circuit in 
There are three factors for a court to consider when determining 
whether unlawful conduct has been adequately attenuated ... (1) 
the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the 
evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) 
the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action. 
m, 140 ldaho at 846, 103 P.3d at 459 (citations omitted). Considering these 
three factors, the ldaho Supreme Court held: 
We find the attenuation analysis in Green to be persuasive. Here, 
there was a minimal lapse of time between the seizure of the 
license and the search pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. The 
police officer's conduct was certainly not flagrant, nor was his 
purpose improper. Clearly, once the officer discovered that there 
was an outstanding arrest warrant, an intervening event under 
Green, he did not have to release Page and was justified in 
arresting him at that point. Once he had effectuated a lawful arrest, 
he was clearly justified in conducting a search incident to that arrest 
for the purpose of officer or public safety or to prevent concealment 
or destruction of evidence. Chime1 v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 
S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Therefore, it was not unlawful 
for the officer to seize the drugs discovered incident to that arrest. 
m, 140 ldaho at 846-847, 103 P.3d at 459-460. The Court emphasized that, 
had the evidence been discovered after the officer seized Page's license but 
before the discovery of the arrest warrant, its discovery would not be sufficiently 
attneuated from the unlawful seizure so as to be admissible. Paqe, 140 ldaho at 
847, 103 P.3d at 460. 
As in m, the elapsed time between the allegedly unlawful conduct - the 
traffic stop - and search pursuant to a valid arrest warrant was minimal. Officer 
Sunada stopped Horton, learned of his identity and ran his information through 
dispatch; once the outstanding warrant was discovered, Horton was arrested and 
the car was searched. See State v. Biqham, 141 ldaho 732, 735, n.1, 117 P.2d 
146, 149 n.1 (Ct. App. 2005) (interpreting the Idaho Supreme Court's 
consideration of the minimal lapse of time "as evidence of a lack of flagrant 
conduct by the officer because the period of unlawful detention was short, and 
not as an application of the first factor of the three-factor test"). 
Like the officer in Paae and unlike the officers in Maland, Officer Sunada's 
conduct was not flagrant nor was his purpose improper. Officer Sunada's 
purpose was certainly proper - he effected the traffic stop based on his 
reasonable belief that the vehicle was operating on the roadway without a front 
license plate in violation of ldaho law. Finally, like &gg and unlike Maland, the 
discovery of the outstanding valid warrant for Horton's arrest constituted an 
intervening circumstance - discovered shortly after the traffic stop but before the 
car was searched and items seized. As in Green and m, the undisputed 
facts of this case show that Horton was wanted on an outstanding confirmed 
arrest warrant at the time of his contact with the police, Officer Sunada's conduct 
and purpose were proper, and he discovered the warrant before any search of 
the car or any seizure of evidence took place. 
I 
Although Horton argued in support of his suppression motion that his initial 
seizure by police during the traffic stop was invalid, he never contested the 
validity of the outstanding warrant for his arrest, much less presented any 
evidence to show that the arrest warrant was invalid. Because a probable cause 
determination to support the arrest had already been made by a neutral, 
I 
detached magistrate, Horton's arrest, and the subsequent search incident to that 
arrest, complied with his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
I searches and seizures as it existed at the time of the arrest and subsequent 
search and eliminated any possible taint of impropriety by police in the initial 
1 seizure of Horton's person. The district court correctly denied Horton's motion to 
suppress. 
D. Horton Has Failed To Show That This Court Should Reach, Much Less 
Decide, Whether The Search Of The Car Was Improper Separate And 
Apart From The Traffic Stop 
Horton did not raise to the district court a separate issue regarding the 
illegality of the search of the vehicle itself but instead relied exclusively on his 
claim that his detention was illegal. Thus, any appellate challenge to the search 
independent of the seizure should not be considered on appeal. State v. Martin, 
119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991) (It is well settled that issues not 
raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.). 
Had Horton raised the issue, it would have failed because the search of the 
vehicle incident to Horton's valid arrest was performed in good faith in 
accordance with the law as it applied at the time of such search. Additionally, 
Horton has failed to show that he would have possessed the requisite standing in 
the vehicle necessary to contest the legality of a search of it. 
1. The Search Incident To Arrest Of The Vehicle Horton Was Drivinq 
Was Done In Good Faith 
In Arizona v. Gant, - U.S. , 129 S.Ct 1710 (2009), the Supreme 
Court of the United States rejected the "bright line" rule of New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454 (1981), and adopted the following legal standard for the search of a 
passenger compartment incident to arrest: "Police may search a vehicle incident 
to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe 
the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." Gant, U . S . ,  129 
S.Ct at 1723. Even if the search of Horton's car was unreasonable under z, 
application of Idaho's exclusionary rule would be unreasonable. The state 
requests this Court to either adopt the exclusionary rule of the Fourth 
Amendment as applicable under ldaho's constitution or, in the alternative, to hold 
that exclusion would be improper under Idaho's standard on the facts of this 
case. 
a. The Exclusionary Rule Under The Idaho Constitution Should 
Be Co-Extensive With The Exciusionarv Rule Of The Fourth 
Amendment 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the question of whether suppression of evidence was 
appropriate where the police had relied upon a facially valid warrant. The Court 
first noted that its precedents did not require exclusion of evidence as a remedy 
for all Fourth Amendment violations. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06 (citing Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)). Nor is suppression a right guaranteed to the 
individual, but is rather a judicially created remedy crafted for its deterrent effect. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 
(1974)). 
The Court further stated that exclusion of evidence is a remedy that exacts 
"substantial social costs" as it impedes the truth finding processes of the judicial 
system, which often results in the guilty going free or receiving reduced 
sentences. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. When applied to actions of law enforcement 
taken in good faith or where the violation was minor, "the magnitude of the 
benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system" and can generate disrespect for the law and the 
administration of justice. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08. Thus, the exclusionary rule 
should be applied only "'where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 910 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 
348). 
Assuming that the exclusionary rule ever has the desired effect of 
discouraging misconduct, "it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to 
deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." Leon, 468 U.S. at 918- 
19. Application of the exclusionary rule "'necessarily assumes that the police 
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (quoting Michiaan 
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). Once an officer has obtained a warrant, 
there is nothing more the officer can do to comply with the law and, therefore, 
"[plenalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot 
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Leon, 
468 U.S. at 921. Thus, the Court held, "the marginal or nonexistent benefits 
produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on 
a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of 
exclusion." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. 
Exclusion of evidence from the execution of an invalid search warrant is 
only appropriate where the magistrate was misled by information the affiant knew 
was false or provided in reckless disregard for its truth; where the issuing 
magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial role;" where probable cause was so 
lacking that "official belief in its existence [was] entirely unreasonable;" and 
where the warrant was so facially deficient that the executing officers could not 
reasonably presume that it was valid. !&on, 468 U.S. at 922-23. 
u s  "good faith" analysis has been applied by the Court in other 
contexts as well. In Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995), Evans was arrested 
on an outstanding warrant and his car searched incident to his arrest. It was 
later learned that the arrest warrant had been quashed 17 days previously, but 
the court failed to notify law enforcement, so the warrant still showed as valid in 
computer records. Id. at 4-5. Concluding that the officer's conduct was 
reasonable, and the error was committed by court employees who would not be 
deterred from improper conduct by suppression of evidence, the Court concluded 
that suppression was not warranted under the Fourth Amendment. @at 14-16. 
Recently the Court decided Herring v. United States, - U.S. -, 129 
S.Ct. 695, 698 (2009), in which Herring had been arrested on the basis of an 
arrest warrant that appeared in computer records maintained by law enforcement 
in a different county, but a search of the actual records after arrest showed the 
warrant had been recalled. The Court held that suppression of evidence of illegal 
possession of a controlled substance and a firearm was not required because the 
I 
police conduct did not rise to the level of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent conduct, or ... recurring or systemic negligence." at -, 129 S.Ct. 
at 702. Suppression is not called for, the Court held, when the police mistakes 
are the result of simple negligence rather than systemic errors or reckless 
disregard of constitutional requirements. Id. at -, 129 S.Ct. at 704. 
In lllinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342-44 (1987), a police officer inspected 
the yard and records of a licensed dealer in automotive parts and scrap pursuant 
to an Illinois statute allowing such searches, and ultimately arrested three people 
for possession of stolen cars. The Illinois statute in question was struck down as 
unconstitutional by a federal court the day after the search. Id. at 344. Applying 
the reasoning of Leon, the Court concluded that the error in that case was the 
Illinois Legislature's act of passing an unconstitutional statute, and that there 
would be no deterrent effect to be gained by suppression. Id. at 349-53. The 
Court held that the officer's reliance on the statute was objectively reasonable; 
therefore the exclusionary rule did not apply. Id. at 356-60. 
The analysis of these cases applies in this one. Officer Sunada acted 
reasonably under the law as it existed at the time. The legality of search incident 
to arrest was well established at that time: 
Under the rule adopted by this Court, the police know what they 
can do after they have made a lawful arrest. The public knows the 
extent of protection afforded from a search while utilizing the 
automobile. The automobile is not a haven for weapons, 
contraband or evidence of criminal activity once the threshold 
requirement that there be a lawful arrest has been reached. 
State v. Watts, 142 ldaho 230, 234, 127 P.3d 133, 137 (2005). It was not 
unreasonable for Officer Sunada to fail to anticipate that that the Supreme Court 
of the United States would, almost two years later, alter the applicable legal 
standards. 
The Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was rejected by a 
two justice plurality3 of the ldaho Supreme Court in State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho 
981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), overruling State v. Prestwich, 116 ldaho 959, 783 
P.2d 298 (1989). The state respectfully submits that Guzman should be 
overruled, and the law as set forth in Prestwich reinstated. Precedence of the 
ldaho Supreme Court can, and should, be overruled if it is manifestly wrong, has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling it is necessary to vindicate 
plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Houahland 
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 ldaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990). The 
In State v. Jose~hson, 123 ldaho 790, 852 P.2d 1387 (1993), a unanimous 
court applied Guzman, holding that it applied retroactively, to reverse a district 
court's denial of suppression. 
Guzman opinion should be overruled because a review of its reasoning shows it 
to be manifestly wrong, and .following persuasive reasoning of the United States 
Supreme Court would result in clarity and uniformity of the law and better meet 
the objectives of the exclusionary rule. 
Writing for the court, Justice Bistline reasoned that ldaho had adopted the 
exclusionary rule at a time when the United States Supreme Court had not made 
the exclusionary rule mandatory upon the states, and that the exclusionary rule 
ldaho adopted was more comprehensive than the federal rule. Because Idaho's 
exclusionary rule was designed to protect broader interests than preventing 
police overreaching, the purpose the Guzman plurality felt was the sole 
underpinning of the exclusionary rule in Leon, the Court reasoned that Idaho's 
history of application of the exclusionary rule was inconsistent with allowing a 
good faith exception. Guzman, 122 ldaho at 992-93, 842 P.2d at 671-72. 
The reasoning of the Guzman plurality is flawed for two reasons. First, a 
review of the ldaho cases upon which Justice Bistline relied does not support his 
conclusions. To the contrary, those cases clearly show that ldaho's exclusionary 
rule is co-extensive with the exclusionary rule as adopted and applied by the 
United States Supreme Court. Second, even assuming that the ldaho 
exclusionary rule serves the purposes of providing a remedy for unreasonable 
searches and seizures, deterring Fourth Amendment violation and protecting 
judicial integrity, the good faith exception as articulated in Leon is consistent with 
those purposes. 
A review of the authority relied upon by the Guzman plurality does not 
support its analysis or results. For example, the court first relied upon State v. 
Arreaui, 44 ldaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927), the case adopting the exclusionary rule 
for Idaho. However, the court in Arreaui specifically relied upon United States 
Supreme Court authority in adopting the exclusionary rule. Arre~ui, 44 ldaho at 
-, 254 P. at 791. Furthermore, the court, quoting a passage from an 
Oklahoma court that it "would not attempt to improve," went so far as to say that 
the "'guarantees of immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures"' in the 
federal and state constitutions "'are practically the same,"' and therefore "'it 
follows without argument that the rule of evidence in the state courts, where like 
facts and principles of law are involved, should conform to that settled by the 
court having supreme prestige and authority."' - Id. (emphasis added) 
(quoting Gore v. State, 218 P. 545, 547 (Ok. Cr. App. 1923)). It is thus clear that 
the ldaho Supreme Court did not adopt an exclusionary rule for the ldaho 
Constitution different from that pronounced by the United States Supreme Court 
for the Fourth Amendment. 
Nor are the other cases relied upon in Guzman indicative that the ldaho 
Supreme Court had ever adopted an exclusionary rule broader than that 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in State v. Rauch, 
99 ldaho 586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978), the court suppressed for failure to comply 
with the knock and announce statutes, relying heavily upon the "landmark case" 
of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). The only mention of the ldaho 
Constitution occurs in the quote of a dissenting opinion. m, 99 ldaho at 593, 
586 P.2d at 678 (quoting State v. Anderson, 31 ldaho 514, 527, 174 P. 124, 129 
(1918) (Morgan, J., dissenting)). There is nothing in the opinion that would 
suggest that the exclusionary rule in ldaho is broader than its federal counterpart. 
Likewise, in State v. LePaae, 102 ldaho 387, 630 P.2d 674 (1981), cerf. 
den. 454 U.S. 1057 (1982), the court determined LePage's right to counsel had 
been violated under both the federal and state constitutions. The part of the 
opinion relied upon by the Guzman court for the proposition that judicial integrity 
is a factor in exclusion is actually a quote from two United States Supreme Court 
cases. In response to a claim that the issue had not been preserved by proper 
objection below, the court stated: 
Finally, we are cognizant of the need to insure that the 
judiciary does function, and is perceived as functioning, in a 
manner consistent with the individual constitutional rights, both 
state and federal, of all who appear before the bar of justice. 
While the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is undoubtedly 
to deter police misconduct, it is also true that at some point the 
courts must simply refuse to countenance certain behavior on the 
part of law enforcement agencies. "Courts . . . cannot and will 
not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of 
citizens by permitting unhindered use of the fruits of such 
invasions." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I ,  13, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). While "the imperative of judicial integrity" 
Elkins v. Unifed Sfafes, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 
L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), may not be the primary reason for refusing to 
allow the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial, it 
certainly requires us to exercise our discretion to review alleged 
errors that affect substantial rights and are "plain" in the sense that 
it is evident that a mistake has occurred. Accordingly, we turn to an 
examination of the merits of LePage's claim. 
LePaae, 102 ldaho at 391-92, 630 P.2d at 678-79 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the part of the LePaae opinion relied upon for the claim that Idaho's 
exclusionary rule is broader than the federal one, and therefore cannot recognize 
a good faith exception, actually states quite the opposite. The court specifically 
referenced both federal and state rights, drawing no distinction between them. 
The court also stated that the primary purpose of the rule is deterring police 
conduct, and the secondary reasoning is that the courts cannot be made a party 
to "certain behavior on the part of law enforcement agencies." This purpose is 
entirely consistent with a good faith exception as articulated in Leon. Finally, the 
court does not rely upon ldaho authority for this proposition, but rather authority 
of the United States Supreme Court. Thus, nothing in the LePage decision 
indicates that the ldaho Supreme Court was adopting or articulating any rule 
different from its federal counterpart or inconsistent with the Leon good faith 
exception. 
A review of the authority relied upon by the Guzman plurality shows that 
there is nothing in those cases indicating that Idaho's exclusionary rule is any 
different than its federal counterpart. To the contrary, those cases show that the 
ldaho Supreme Court has consistently looked to the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court in both adopting and defining the exclusionary rule in 
ldaho law. Because Guzman misinterpreted and misapplied ldaho law, it should 
be overruled, and the ldaho exclusionary rule be interpreted as coextensive with 
exclusion as required by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The second flaw of Guzman is its contention that the Leon good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule is inimical to the values of exclusion unrelated 
to police deterrence. The plurality contended that Idaho's exclusionary rule 
served the purposes of providing a remedy for unreasonable searches and 
seizures, deterring police misconduct, encouraging thoroughness in the warrant 
application process, preventing an "additional constitutional violation" by allowing 
consideration of the evidence, and preserving judicial integrity. Guzman, 122 
ldaho at 993, 842 P.2d at 672. The United States Supreme Court persuasively 
addressed these concerns, explaining why they do not require suppression of 
evidence where the police have acted objectively reasonably. 
The Leon Court did not, as implied in Guzman, reject remedial or other 
concerns in the exclusionary rule. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-13. The Court started 
its analysis of exclusion as a remedy by specifically noting that exclusion is a 
court-created - not a constitutionally mandated - remedy. Leon, 468 U.S. at 
905-06. This remedy is sensitive to the costs it exacts, and is to be restricted to 
those areas "'where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-08 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348). 
Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, because of those costs, tends 
to generate, not prevent, disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908. Thus, the Court had previously found limitations on the 
exclusionary rule related to federal habeas corpus; grand jury proceedings; civil 
trials; where a particular defendant had no standing; in using the evidence for 
rebuttal; and refusing to adopt a "but for" standard for suppression. Leon, 468 
U.S. at 909-1 1. A rule that does not require suppression of evidence where the 
police have acted objectively reasonably is thus consistent with the limited 
remedial and other purposes of the exclusionary rule. The ldaho courts have 
adopted the same limitations on Idaho's exclusionary rule, implicitly recognizing 
the same balancing of the rule's costs against its benefits. 
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter overzealous law 
enforcement officers from violating the rights of suspects. LePaae, 102 ldaho at 
391, 630 P.2d at 678. The Leon Court addressed other purposes for the 
exclusionary rule and found them inadequate to justify excluding evidence 
obtained by a police officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable in 
obtaining and executing a search warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 921 n.22, 922. 
This authority and reasoning is persuasive, and should guide the ldaho courts in 
application of the exclusionary rule under the ldaho Constitution. 
b. Suppression Of Evidence Would Be Improper Under Idaho's 
Exclusionarv Rule 
Even under the exclusionary rule of Guzman suppression is unwarranted 
in this case. As noted above, the ldaho exclusionary rule serves the purposes of 
providing a remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures, deterring police 
misconduct, encouraging thoroughness in the warrant application process, 
preventing an "additional constitutional violation" by allowing consideration of the 
evidence, and preserving judicial integrity. Guzman, 122 ldaho at 993, 842 P.2d 
at 672. None of these goals is served by suppression in this case. 
First, suppression in this case does not provide a remedy for 
unreasonable searches and seizures. At the time Officer Sunada searched 
Horton's car, the search was reasonable under the existing state of the law. 
m, 142 ldaho at 234, 127 P.3d at 137. Applying the exclusionary rule would 
provide a "remedy" for conduct that was legal and reasonable at the time it 
occurred. The reasonableness of the officer's actions only comes into question 
by applying law that did not even exist until almost two years after the search 
took place. Such application would be a windfall rather than a remedy. 
Second, as mentioned above, application of the exclusionary rule in this 
case cannot conceivably provide any deterrent. Neither police nor anyone else 
can be deterred from failing to follow the guidelines of Gant by suppressing the 
fruit of searches conducted before Gant was even decided. 
Third, exclusion will not encourage thoroughness in the warrant 
application process because there was no search warrant. Nor will suppression 
encourage thoroughness in the decision to search a car incident to arrest 
because officers will certainly be required to follow Gant now that that case has 
been decided. 
Fourth, there would be no "additional constitutional violation" by use of the 
evidence. Idaho's constitution contains no express or implied constitutional right 
to prevent the prosecution from using evidence seized pursuant to a search that 
was legal under the law and precedents existing at the time of the search. 
Finally, application of the exclusionary rule would not preserve judicial 
integrity. Quite the opposite would occur by applying the exclusionary rule in the 
context of this case. As noted by the Supreme Court, application of the 
exclusionary rule imposes substantial societal costs in allowing the guilty to go 
free. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. To mandate those costs without any benefit does 
not preserve judicial integrity. Likewise, to punish society because an officer 
failed to anticipate a change in the law that governed his conduct is not an act of 
integrity, but an act without reason. 
In this case the search was reasonable under the law at the time it was 
conducted. To date, the search is still reasonable under applicable authority 
interpreting the ldaho Constitution. If the law is to be changed to retroactively 
render the search unreasonable, then the exclusionary rule does not apply 
because suppression of evidence of a search that was lawful when conducted 
would not meet any underlying rationale for the exclusionary rule. 
2. Horton Has Failed To Show That He Had Standina In The Vehicle 
Such To Exhibit A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy 
Had Horton preserved for appeal an issue regarding the actual search of 
the vehicle he was driving, such a claim must fail because Horton failed to prove 
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle to provide him with 
standing to challenge the search. The threshold burden when contesting an 
illegal search is demonstrating that one has legitimate privacy interests. State v. 
f%&m, 130 ldaho 960, 961, 950 P.2d 1299, 1300 (Ct. App. 1997). The ldaho 
courts have adopted the familiar two-part inquiry to determine whether an 
accused person's Fourth Amendment rights have been implicated by a search. 
"When assessing a claim of a Fourth Amendment violation, we may begin by 
asking whether the complainant exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of 
privacy and if so, whether that expectation of privacy is one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable." State v. Morris, 131 ldaho 562, 565, 961 
P.2d 653, 656 (Ct. App. 1998). See also State v. Cowen, 104 ldaho 649, 651, 
662 P.2d 230, 232 (1983); State v. Holman, I09 ldaho 382, 385, 707 P.2d 493, 
496 (Ct. App. 1985) (&, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 
507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). In State v. Munhall, 118 ldaho 602, 605, 798 P.2d 
61, 64 (Ct. App. 1990), the court held that Munhall had no standing to contest the 
search of the vehicle he was driving where Munhall failed to demonstrate any 
"propriety interest in the vehicle giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy 
within." 
Here, there is no evidence that Horton had any propriety interest in the 
vehicle he was driving. The license plate attached to the vehicle when Horton 
was stopped belonged to a repossession agency. Testimony by Brian Dean, a 
senior special agent in charge of the ldaho Transportation Department at the 
suppression hearing made clear the limited purpose for which the repossession 
plates are used: 
Q ;  Okay, and what specifically - under what circumstances is 
repossession plate, then, to be used? 
A: The application logistically for Tactical Recovery at this point 
would be for them to recover the vehicle and take it back to the 
lender's place of business. 
Q: Okay. For any other driving purposes, moving the vehicle 
elsewhere, or if somebody buys it or wants to drive it around, can it 
be used for that? 
A: The only other application would be the financial institution 
showing it for resale. 
(Tr., p. 20, Ls. 1-13.) Horton presented no evidence that he owned the car or 
had any association with the repossession agency who owned the license plate. 
Even if he had he would have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
vehicle that he was supposed to pick up from one place and deliver to another. 
As such, Horton failed to prove that he had standing to contest the ultimate 
search of the vehicle he was driving. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying the motion for suppression of evidence. 
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